Knowing How One Knows by Rolla, Giovanni
LOGOS & EPISTEME, X, 2 (2019): 195-205 
KNOWING HOW ONE KNOWS 
Giovanni ROLLA 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person 
knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based 
account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ 
principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – 
according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby 
possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes 
successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies second-
order practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed non-
intellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about 
knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering 
some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.  
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1. The Story So Far  
Since Hintikka’s1 ground-breaking work, the thesis known as the ‘KK’ principle 
has been under dispute. It says that if one knows that p, one knows (or is in a 
position to know) that one knows that p. The interest on the principle quickly 
reached debates beyond that of its acceptability for systems of epistemic logic. The 
internalist-externalist dispute on knowledge is perhaps the most prolific discussion 
on that matter. Internalists, following the traditional view that knowledge is an 
internally accessible state, were inclined to endorse something like the KK 
principle, whereas externalists were confident about its rejection.  
Many externalists reject the principle based on the following argument:2 If 
knowing that p implies having a true belief that p that also satisfies an external 
condition – say, being reliably produced – then knowing that one knows that p 
implies knowing that the belief in question is produced by a reliable process. 
However, most people who know many mundane propositions seldom entertain 
beliefs about the reliability of their belief-forming processes, so they certainly do 
                                                        
1 Jakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca, New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); 
Jakko Hintikka, “Knowing That One Knows,” Synthese 21 (1970): 141–62. 
2 For a run-down of these instances, see Samir Okasha, “On a Flawed Argument against the KK 
Principle,” Analysis 73, 1 (2013): 80–86. 
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not know that they know. Thus, the externalist argument goes, the KK principle is 
false.  
Samir Okasha3 has made a very compelling point that the argument above is 
logically flawed. The problem is that externalists have systematically committed an 
intentional fallacy. The second ‘K’ in the KK principle occurs in an intentional 
context, so knowing that one knows does not imply knowing the following 
(implausible, anyway) conjunction: that one believes that p, p and one’s belief that 
p was reliably formed. Instead, second-order knowledge implies only that: one 
believes that one knows that p, it is true that one knows that p and one’s belief that 
one knows that p was reliably formed. This is a much more plausible take on the 
KK principle, one that is at least prima facie compatible with externalists views on 
knowledge.  
But there are more compelling arguments against the principle. Tim 
Williamson’s4 in particular makes a convincing case against the putative luminosity 
of knowledge. Williamson defines luminosity through the following condition:5 
(L) For every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one is in a position to know that 
C obtains.  
For reasons that will soon become apparent, I take the condition above to 
express a specific kind of luminosity, one that I call “bright luminosity.” 
Williamson’s argument against bright luminosity for knowledge depends on a 
scenario such as this:  
Mrs. Coldhot: 
Mrs. Coldhot wants to keep track of whether she is felling cold or hot at each 
millisecond during a whole morning. Imagine that, at the beginning of the 
morning, Mrs. Coldhot feels cold. Imagine also that, at noon, she feels hot. Now 
suppose for reduction that feeling cold or hot satisfies the (bright) luminosity 
condition. If knowledge implies that one could not easily be mistaken about one’s 
target belief, then if one knows that p at any given time, it follows that p is true 
not only at the time one knows, but also true at the next millisecond, for these 
moments are very similar. Therefore, when Mrs. Coldhot iterates the process of 
judging how she feels, she knows that for any millisecond that comes after the 
beginning of the morning, that she feels cold. Then, she feels cold at noon –but 
that contradicts our initial supposition, so feeling cold or hot is not (brightly) 
luminous.  
                                                        
3 Okasha, “On a Flawed Argument.” 
4 Timothy Wiliamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
5 Cf. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, 95. 
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According to Williamson, the argument applies equally well to every non-
trivial condition. Since knowledge is a non-trivial condition, it follows that 
knowledge is not (brightly) luminous.  
That is a very plausible outcome, but we may not be ready to give up on the 
luminosity of knowledge just yet. I argue that there is a conceptual connection 
between some of our mental states and our knowledge of them. Thus, I follow 
what Stalnaker6 claims to be the standard way of reconciling the KK thesis, or 
something akin to it, with externalists conceptions of mind and knowledge. What 
is specific about this strategy is that the relevant knowledge of our mental states is 
practical rather than propositional or direct. So first-order propositional knowledge 
implies second-order practical or procedural knowledge. In other words, knowing 
that p implies knowing how to know that p. This, however, depends on a non-
intellectualist construal of know-how. I will not argue for that latter position, nor 
will I argue, at least not directly, against the intellectualism proposed by Stanley, 
Stanley and Williamson, Brogaard or any others.7 The results advanced here, 
however, do depend on a non-reductive view on knowledge-how. Despite the fact 
that the account of know-how presented here is non-reductive, it allows for a 
conceptual analogy between propositional and practical knowledge, thus, it 
satisfies a desideratum of explanatory unity of knowledge without implying 
intellectualism.  
2. Dim Luminosity and Knowing How to Know  
Not everything that is luminous is bright. A condition C is dimly luminous if and 
only if (D-L) obtains:  
(D-L) For every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one knows how C obtains.  
At least some types of knowledge are dimly luminous, namely, know-how 
and know-that.8 The argument for that claim depends on two related views on 
                                                        
6 Robert Stalnaker, “Luminosity and the KK Thesis,” in Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and 
Skepticism, ed. Sanford C. Goldberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 21. 
7 Jason Stanley, Know How (Oxford University Press, 2011); Jason Stanley and Timothy 
Williamson, “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy 98, 8 (2001): 411–44; Berit Brogaard. 
“What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 78, 2 (2009): 439–67. 
8 It is more controversial whether, if one knows a place or an object, one knows how one knows 
it. The same point applies to knowledge-wh (when, where, who). But if these types of 
knowledge could be described as knowledge-that, then they are dimly luminous. It is 
implausible, however, that we can reduce knowledge-wh to knowledge-that without committing 
knowledge-how to the same fate. 
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knowledge, the first of which is already present in Williamson’s argument against 
bright luminosity:  
(Safety) if S knows that p, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in 
which S forms her belief that p in the same way as in the actual world, S only 
believes that p when p is true.9 
(Stability) if S knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible 
worlds in which S does φ in the same way as in the actual world, S only φes 
successfully.  
Safety and Stability arise from the same concern, viz., that knowing is 
incompatible with getting it right by luck.10 As the post-Gettier literature made 
abundantly clear, subjects in Gettier-style cases lack propositional knowledge 
because they could easily be mistaken. Hence, Safety is a necessary condition for 
knowledge. It may not be a sufficient condition – as shown by cases where the 
subject arrives at safe true beliefs because an epistemic angel changes the world to 
fit her beliefs.11 However we attempt to explain cases like that – say, by adding 
credit for arriving at true beliefs or by taking cognitive achievement as a additional 
necessary conditions for knowledge – Safety remains a plausible necessary 
condition. In Williamson’s original argument against luminosity, Safety is the basis 
for the claim that, if Mrs. Coldhot is feeling cold at any given time, then she is cold 
at the next millisecond, given that these instants are modally close.  
Stability is simply one way to develop the same insight underlying safety 
when it comes to know-how. The basic idea is that knowing how to do something 
implies having an ability, or set of abilities, that, when properly exercised in 
                                                        
9 The definition is due to Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 
163, which is intended to deal with a number of counterexamples. I have omitted the mention of 
the contingency of the target-belief for simplicity, since it does not affect my point here. Also, 
safety is not without its worries: cf. Ram Neta and Guy Rohrbaugh, “Luminosity and the Safety 
of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004): 396–506; Avram Hiller and Ram Neta, 
“Safety and Epistemic Luck,” Synthese 158, 3 (2007): 303–13. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to save safety from these criticisms.  
10 I am not relying on any specific taxonomy of luck. Even though having a true belief through 
luck – what is sometimes called veritic luck, and can be divided into intervening or 
environmental luck - is clearly a case of getting it right by luck, not all lucky achievements are 
veritic. If a non-intellectualism about know-how of the kind assumed here is correct, the kind of 
luck that affects know-how is not veritic because there may not be beliefs involved in practical 
knowledge at all, a fortiori, there may not be beliefs which are true due to luck doing any 
negative epistemic work in practical cases of lucky achievement. 
11 Duncan Pritchard, “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?” Journal of Philosophical 
Research 34 (2009): 33–45. 
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sufficiently similar circumstances, guarantees success. A professional footballer that 
hits the perfect cross knows how to do so because she is able to perform similarly 
in sufficiently similar situations. A beginner might even, on occasion, hit the 
perfect cross as well, but she might fail to do so on many other occasions. The 
difference between the professional and the beginner is that the former is able, in 
an epistemically robust sense, to hit the perfect cross, whereas the later lacks the 
requisite abilities.12 Analogously to Safety, Stability is intended to be a plausible 
necessary condition for know-how, even though other necessary conditions can be 
added. Note, moreover, that because having and exercising an ability is necessarily 
creditable to an individual, we do not need to add another condition to rule out 
cases that are analogous to that of epistemic angels that fix the world in order for it 
to coincide with one’s beliefs. Also, my argument here works as long as believing 
that there is a correct way of φying, in a manner which is sufficient for knowledge, 
is not another necessary condition for φying successfully. We may sometimes, or 
even always, form corresponding beliefs that describe the correct or best ways of 
doing something, and we may even do that on a sufficiently strong epistemic basis, 
but that is completely incidental to whether we know how to do it.  
Thus, knowing-how is being able to successfully do something in a stable 
manner. That might raise a familiar concern, namely: we are fallible creatures but 
that account left no room for error. We could, it seems, be able to φ and still fail 
systematically at φying. If a notion of ability cannot account for that apparent fact, 
then it is inherently flawed. The objection assumes that the only conceptual room 
for error lies between exercising an ability and getting it right. But that is false: we 
may fail because we failed to exercise the correct ability (or set of abilities) for 
doing something, despite our best intentions, or because we failed at exercising it 
according to what the situation demands. Millar13 makes that same point regarding 
recognitional abilities, and it seems that his view also applies to the notion of 
ability in general. So the notion of ability developed here does make room for 
error.  
The claim that knowing how to φ implies having the ability to φ is prima 
facie quite plausible, but it has been challenged. Consider the following case, 
which is adapted from Carr:14 
 
                                                        
12 Ability possession is certainly a matter of degree - one can be more or less able to dosomething, 
but my argument is indifferent to that.  
13 Alan Millar, “How Visual Perception Yields Reason for Belief,” Philosophical Issues 21, The 
Epistemology of Perception (2011): 332–51. 
14 David Carr, “Knowledge in Practice,” American Philosophical Quarterly 18, 1 (1981): 53–61. 
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Arthritic Ana:  
Ana is an arthritic piano teacher. Ana knows how to play the piano because she 
has played it her whole life, but since her rheumatoid condition worsened, she 
became unable to play. However, she can still teach her pupils on how to play any 
given piece. Ana knows how to play the piano, but she does not have the ability 
to do so.  
The case seems to show that knowing-how does not imply possessing and 
exercising certain abilities. We can, however, resist that conclusion, for Arthritic 
Ana’s case is underdescribed. Instead of ascribing her know-how, it is possible to 
construe her situation as follows: her expertise in piano playing enables her to 
describe the correct way to play a given piece in a very nuanced and precise 
manner, but that is a matter of a propositionally articulated epistemic status (either 
knowing-that and understanding-that). That explains how she can teach her pupils 
without implying that she knows how to play, because she is unable to do so. The 
point is that she has the relevant piano-playing abilities, but her actual condition is 
one in which she cannot exercise her abilities successfully across a sufficiently 
large class of nearby possible worlds, including the actual one. So her abilities are, 
as it were, pragmatically defeated, which in turn defeats her know-how. Remove 
the pragmatic defeater (her rheumatoid condition), and her practical knowledge is 
restored.  
On the other hand, it seems we can imagine a case where one is able to φ 
without knowing how to φ. Consider the following case, also from Carr:15 
Lucy the Lucky Gymnast: 
Lucy is a beginner gymnast. After only a couple of classes, and without previous 
training, she attempts to do a challenging somersault, one that could only be 
achieved by a more proficient gymnast. Surpassing all expectations, she succeeds.  
Lucky Lucy’s case suggests that she is able to do a somersault – for, after all, 
she has done it – without knowing how to do so. We may resist that conclusion 
too, because there is an ambiguity at bay. We consider her able to do a somersault 
only in hindsight, and this is a weaker sense of “being able” than the one in play in 
Stability. Of course, in a sense, we are able to do many things that we are actually 
unable to do in another, more robust sense. I am able, in the weakest sense, to 
write an enthralling, best seller novel – I have a bunch of loose ideas and I know 
how to write. But I am not able to do so in a more robust sense: it would be a 
surprise for anyone if I were to write a best seller novel, myself included. In the 
relevant sense, being able to do something generates stable expectations of success, 
                                                        
15 Carr, “Knowledge in Practice.” 
Knowing How One Knows 
201 
something that Lucy clearly lacks. The answer whose question shows whether one 
is able to φ is not “did he or she φed?,” but “is he or she capable of φying again?”  
Finally, here is how knowing that p satisfies (D-L): given Safety, if a person 
knows that p, she could not be easily mistaken about p. That is, in all, if not all, 
nearby possible worlds where she believes that p through the same means as in the 
actual world, p is true. Given Stability, if she knows how to arrive at knowledge 
that p in the actual world, then she successfully does so in all, if not all, nearby 
possible worlds where she attempts to do so through the same abilities as in the 
actual world. So the possible worlds where a person knows that p are the ones 
where she knows how to know that p.16 Thus, for every case α, if in α one knows 
that p, the n in α one is in a position to know how one knows that p.  
Knowing-how to know-that, in the sense I am advancing here, is being able 
to perform the same procedures, whatever they are, that generate first-order 
propositional knowledge in sufficiently similar circumstances. This view is neutral 
regarding which specific account of propositional knowledge is endorsed, as long as 
it makes room for Safety. Accounts that deny the necessity of ruling out certain 
cases of lucky achievement, such as Turri’s,17 do not satisfy Safety, and do not meet 
(prima facie at least) the requirements for dim luminosity of knowledge.  
Moreover, knowing-how also trivially satisfies (D-L). Whenever one knows 
how to φ, one knows how one knows how to φ. This implies that knowing how 
one knows at an order n can be iterated in an+1 order. Because I am assuming a 
non-intellectualism about know-how, iteration is not an issue. It would be 
problematic only if it required the individual to form higher-order beliefs at every 
new step, with the sufficient epistemic support for knowledge; but this account of 
know-how does not implies believing, nor believing in an epistemically robust 
way. It implies only that the individual who has practical or procedural knowledge 
is able to perform in a sufficiently stable way in sufficiently similar circumstances. 
Accordingly, because knowing how to φ does not imply believing, in a sufficiently 
robust epistemic manner, that there is a correct way to φ, and because knowing-
                                                        
16 There might be possible worlds where she knows how to know that p but does not exercise the 
relevant abilities, so, in these worlds, she would not know that p. However, we could, in 
principle, advance the more contentious claims that the possible worlds where a person knows 
that p and the the ones where she knows how to know that p are coextensive. In order to do so, 
we would have to claim that not only knowing how to φ is a matter of being able to φ 
successfully in a sufficiently stable manner, but also that a person is only able to φ if she 
effectively φes. My case for dim luminosity does not rely on that claim. I thank Luis Rosa for that 
suggestion. 




that implies believing, it follows that dim luminosity does not imply bright 
luminosity. That is, if one is in a case where one knows that p – which implies, via 
dim luminosity, that one knows how to know that p – it does not follow that one 
knows that one knows that p, nor that one knows that one knows how to know 
that p.  
One advantage of dim luminosity is that it secures the intuition shared 
among virtue reliabilists that propositional knowledge implies cognitive 
achievement.18 According to these authors, if one knows that p, one has credit for 
arriving at the true belief that p – alternatively, the true belief that p is creditable 
to one’s reliable epistemic dispositions. Thus, knowledge is a matter of achieving a 
true belief. Now, setting the notion of cognitive achievement at the center of one’s 
conception of knowledge is notoriously tricky, for it seems to exclude testimonial 
knowledge, for it could be acquired effortlessly by the one receiving the 
testimony.19 The view developed here is able to salvage the intuition regarding 
credit without incompatibility with testimonial knowledge, for credit lies at the 
second-order epistemic status of the knower. The idea is that if one comes to know 
that p because one acquires the belief that p on the basis of a testimony from a 
reliable source, then one could not easily belief falsely that p based on that source. 
That being the case, one knows how to acquire that same piece of knowledge in 
similar situations – for one is able to base one’s belief that p on the testimony of 
that knowledge source. This solution depends on the plausible premise that being 
able to φ, in the sense discussed above, is a cognitive achievement.  
3. Against Dim Luminosity  
It seems that we can conceive of cases where an individual knows that p but does 
not know how he knows that p, so that knowledge is not even dimly luminous. 
Consider BonJour’s Norman case.20 Norman has clairvoyant powers that enable 
him to reliably track the president’s actual location – say, the president is in a hotel 
in Moscow – despite the fact that all available evidences points towards him being 
                                                        
18 See Wayne Riggs, “Reliability and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 64, 1 (2002): 79–96; Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology – Apt Belief 
and Reflective Knowledge. Vol. 1, (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 2007); John Greco, 
“Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in Intellectual Virtudes: Perspectives from Ethics and 
Epistemology, eds. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzbeski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). I am thankful to Gregory Gaboardi for this observation. 
19 Jennifer Lackey, “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know,” Synthese 158, 3 
(2007): 345–61. 
20 Laurence BonJour, “Externalists Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 5 (1980): 53–73. 
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in Washington. Norman has no prior belief, in favor or against, his clairvoyance. 
The verdict is that there is something wrong with Norman’s epistemic situation. 
Internalists, such as BonJour himself, claim that even though Norman satisfies an 
externalists condition, he lacks knowledge because he lacks reasons in favor of his 
belief regarding the president’s actual location. Now, if we are going to assume that 
Norman’s powers are capable of generating true beliefs in a safe manner, we may 
be tempted to say that he knows that p (where p is the relevant propositional about 
presidential whereabouts). But what is troubling is that there is a clear sense that 
Norman does not know how he knows that p.21 
That case, however, can be explained away because clairvoyance is a bizarre 
epistemic ability. Once we consider whether Normans knows how he knows that 
p, matters become muddled, because it is not clear whether there are many, or any 
for that matter, nearby possible worlds in which Norman is able to arrive at his 
first-order knowledge in a similar manner. And this explains why we might be 
tempted to revoke his putative first-order knowledge. The problem, therefore, lies 
not with dim luminosity, but on the epistemic ability in question, for intuitions 
about it tend to colapse. Consider, in contrast, the less controversial ability of 
chicken-sexing. If the chicken-sexer is in indeed able to form safe beliefs about the 
subject matter, then there is no doubt she is able to achieve second-order 
procedural knowledge, even if she fails to meet an internalist condition. 
Now, can we use Williamson’s argument, which was directed at bright 
luminosity, to show that one can know that p without knowing how one knows? 
After all, knowing how to φ is a non-trivial state, so it seems that dim luminosity 
for knowledge fares no better than its brighter cousin. Take Mrs. Coldhot case 
again. If she knows that she is feeling cold at a time t, then she knows how to 
arrive at her first-order knowledge at t. Also, if she knows that she is feeling cold 
at t, then she is cold at t+1, given Safety (and factivity of knolwedge). Also, if she 
knows how to arrive at her first-order knowledge that she is feeling cold at t, then 
she knows that she is feeling cold at t+1. However, that would lead to the same 
contradiction as before, because if she iterates the same procedure throughout the 
morning, she is feeling cold at noon, contrary to one of our initial assumptions.  
The problem of that argument lies in the premise that, if she knows how to 
arrive at her first-order knowledge that she is feeling cold at t, then she knows that 
she is feeling cold at t+1. Given that there is a close connection between knowing 
how to arrive at a knowledgeable belief and arriving at that belief, at the last state 
when Mrs. Coldhot feels cold, there are many nearby possible worlds where she no 
longer feels cold. If, in these possible worlds, she tries to arrive at a knowledgeable 
                                                        
21I am thankful to Gregory Gaboardi for these comments. 
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belief that she feels cold, but fails to do so (because she no longer feels cold), then 
she did not meet the Stability condition. And failing to do so, she does not know 
that she feels cold at t+1. The crucial point here is that know-how implies stable 
success, just like know-that implies safe true believing.  
There seems to be some empirical evidence against the view advanced here 
and against the value and efficiency of reflection more generally.22 In particular, 
consider the following experiment. Data gathered by Halberstadt and Wilson23 
shows that verbalized reasoning is objectively less reliable than what they call 
affect heuristics, viz., “domain-specific relationships between feeling states and 
objective states of the world.”24 Affect heuristics are cognitive procedures that use 
subjectively available cues in decision making, judgements, inferences and so on. 
One clear example of affect heuristics is that of assessing whether A is more 
familiar, for the individual, than B in order to establish some objective results (e.g.: 
whether A is more popular than B). Experiments mentioned by Halberstadt and 
Wilson also show that reasoners – individuals who try to explicitly explain how 
they arrive at certain predictions – often impair the objective quality of their 
judgements, whereas those that simply use affect heuristic are more likely to attain 
the correct results. For instance, in a study conducted by Halberstadt andLevine,25 
71 subjects were asked to predict 8 basketball games in 1995 (the same experiment 
was replicated with 52 participants in 1996). Half of the experimenters were asked 
to jot down the reasons for their predictions, whereas the other half followed their 
instinct without analysing their reasons (the so called nonreasoners). Overall, 
nonreasoners got the right outcome for 70,4% of the matches, almost 5% more 
than reasoners. There is a lot going on in the case above, but the important point is 
this: both groups had the same knowledge basis for predicting the outcome of 
basketball games – but when reasoners tried to show how they know that one team 
was more likely to win than the other, they ended up affecting their first-order 
knowledge negatively. So it seems that not only knowing that p does not imply 
knowing how one knows, but also that attempting to show how one’s first-order 
beliefs or knowledge are arrived at is epistemically hindering, albeit marginally so.  
                                                        
22  For a battery of arguments against reflection, see Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
23 Jamin Halberstadt and Timothy Wilson, “Reflections on Conscious Reflection: Mechanisms of 
Impairment and Analysis,” in Reasoning: Studies of Human Interfaces and Its Foundations, eds. 
Jonathan E. Adler and Lance J. Rips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 548–65. 
24 Halberstadt and Wilson, “Reflections on Conscious Reflection,” 554. 
25 Jamin Halberstadt and Gary Levine, “Effects on Reason Analysis on the Accuracy of Predicting 
Basketball Games,” Journal of Applied Social Pyschology 29, 3 (1999): 517–30. 
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The issue could be avoided if we keep in mind that knowing how one knows 
is not reducible to knowing that one knows. We need to add to that the prima facie 
plausible premise that making one’s knowledge explicit through reasons is 
essentially a matter of articulating pieces of propositional knowledge (or 
justification), which also involves exhibiting the correct abilities in reasoning. That 
is, it is plausible that reasoning requires both having reasons in support of one’s 
beliefs and being able to use these reasons competently. The underlying view here 
is a “two-components” explication of rational capacities.26 If reasoning involves 
both know-how and know-that, then it is possible that what is doing all the 
negative epistemic work for the reasoners, but not for the non-reasoners, is the 
formers’ propositional second-order justification. That is, when one tries to make 
one’s reasons explicit in order to articulate one’s first-order knowledge pieces, one 
might fail to achieve propositional second-order knowledge. Clearly, more 
(empirical) explanatory work has to be done in order to show how knowing that 
one knows goes awry in cases like the above, but I am not going to pursue this 
matter here.  
4. Conclusion  
The intuition that knowing implies some sort of reflective attitude has persisted 
through much of the history of epistemology. One way to cash-out its details is 
through the infamous KK principle. Although recently that principle has been 
under attack, especially from the externalist camp, it seems we can rescue the 
original intuition by carefully distinguishing between knowing-that and knowing-
how. These are conceptually distinct epistemic attitudes, but are understood 
minimally as implying Safety and Stability, thus they share a common core. 
Accordingly, whenever one knows that p, one knows how one knows that p. 
Knowledge is luminous, but only dimly so. 
                                                        
26 Luis Rosa, “In order to be rational you need to know how to reason,” Philosophical Inquiries 4, 
1 (2016): 25–40. 
